Animals process sensory information according to specific computational rules and, subsequently, form representations of their environments that form the basis for decisions and choices. The specific computational rules used by organisms will often be evolutionarily adaptive by generating higher probabilities of survival, reproduction, and resource acquisition. Experiments with enclosed colonies of bumblebees constrained to foraging on artificial flowers suggest that the bumblebee's cognitive architecture is designed to efficiently exploit floral resources from spatially structured environments given limits on memory and the neuronal processing of information. A non-linear relationship between the biomechanics of nectar extraction and rates ofnet energetic gain by individual bees may account for sensitivities to both the arithmetic mean and variance in reward distributions in flowers. Heuristic rules that lead to efficient resource exploitation may also lead to subjective misperception oflikelihoods. Subjective probability formation may then be viewed as a problem in pattern recognition subject to specific sampling schemes and memory constraints. T single task-collecting nectar and pollen for the colony. Worker bumblebees are sterile and, therefore, not concerned with acquiring mates or reproductive decisions. They are largely free from predation and, unlike honeybees, do not communicate with each other about resources. The energy reserves of the colony are tied to the colony's reproductive success, so individual foraging behavior has consequences for genetic representation in the future. Consequently, the bumblebee is an autonomous agent engaged solely in one important activity of obvious evolutionary significance.
Animals process sensory information according to specific computational rules and, subsequently, form representations of their environments that form the basis for decisions and choices. The specific computational rules used by organisms will often be evolutionarily adaptive by generating higher probabilities of survival, reproduction, and resource acquisition. Experiments with enclosed colonies of bumblebees constrained to foraging on artificial flowers suggest that the bumblebee's cognitive architecture is designed to efficiently exploit floral resources from spatially structured environments given limits on memory and the neuronal processing of information. A non-linear relationship between the biomechanics of nectar extraction and rates ofnet energetic gain by individual bees may account for sensitivities to both the arithmetic mean and variance in reward distributions in flowers. Heuristic rules that lead to efficient resource exploitation may also lead to subjective misperception oflikelihoods. Subjective probability formation may then be viewed as a problem in pattern recognition subject to specific sampling schemes and memory constraints.
T HE EMERGING FIELD OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE ALTEMPTS TO explain the nature of thought and the appearance of intelligence. Cognitive analyses have mostly been applied to language capabilities and the acquisition of skills in humans (1) , but have been expanded to include problem-solving and communication in animals (2) (3) (4) (5) . The cognitivist view suggests that the processing of information (by either animals or humans) involves three stages. First, sensory data are translated and encoded into a form that can be manipulated through mental operations. Second, encoded information is acted upon by specific computational rules. And third, these rules produce alternative "representational' states that depend on the informational input. The concept of "representation" remains controversial, especially for animals (5) . However, these three stages may be viewed, in a less controversial manner, as three components of a single dynamical system mechanistically tied to the organism's nervous system. The encoding of information would then correspond to initial inputs, computational rules correspond to transient dynamics, and representations would correspond to the equilibrium configurations resulting from the transient dynamics. The animal reaches a representation of the environment through the operation of specific computational rules applied to a particular pattern of incoming sensory information.
The computational rules used by organisms can be symbolprocessing programs, as in most artificial intelligence models (6) , or can be models of nervous systems, as in neural networks (7) . My thesis is that these computational rules are evolutionarily adaptive. Different computational schemes may generate behaviors or representation of the environment that lead to different efficiencies in the use of resources, acquisition of mates, or acquisition of skills necessary for survival. Differential efficiencies may then confer different evolutionary advantages. The design features of information-processing ("cognitive architecture") may be subject to natural selection in a manner analogous to any other aspect of the organism's phenotype.
The link between mental process, cognition, and evolution originates in Darwin's writings (8) and has found continuous support from many investigators since the Darwinian revolution (9) . Many more recent studies have explicitly examined the adaptive nature of specific mental processes in animals and have argued for varying degrees of adaptive specialization in mental function to accommodate specific ecological requirements (10) . Few single task-collecting nectar and pollen for the colony. Worker bumblebees are sterile and, therefore, not concerned with acquiring mates or reproductive decisions. They are largely free from predation and, unlike honeybees, do not communicate with each other about resources. The energy reserves of the colony are tied to the colony's reproductive success, so individual foraging behavior has consequences for genetic representation in the future. Consequently, the bumblebee is an autonomous agent engaged solely in one important activity of obvious evolutionary significance.
Bumblebees are also easy to investigate under controlled conditions. Their foraging can be restricted to sets of artificial flowers whose energetic characteristics can be experimentally manipulated.
In the experiments I describe, colonies of wild bumblebees were transferred into a large enclosure consisting of a frame surrounded with netting. Into this enclosure I placed a 1.2 m by 1.2 m by 6 mm sheet of dear plastic with 0.5-cm wells drilled 2.5 cm apart. This generated a field of 2016 possible flower positions. Artificial cardboard flowers of different colors were centered under specified wells generating, for example, a field of 100 blue and 100 yellow flowers randomly dispersed over the 1.44-m2 foraging field (11) . Known quantities of artificial nectar (diluted honey) were then dispensed into the artificial flowers to generate a specific distribution of rewards associated with each of the floral types. The nectar distributions, flower colors, and spatial distribution varied from experiment to experiment. The basic technique, however, remained the same.
Economics of Choice Under Uncertainty
Cognitive psychologists traditionally divide mental operations into lower level and higher level cognitive tasks. Lower level cognition would include some forms of learning (for example, habituation), pattern recognition, and perception; higher level cognitive tasks include language, communication, complex learning and memory, and problem-solving and task-acquisition (1) . I will focus almost entirely on problem-solving and task-acquisition in bumblebees and more specifically on certain forms of "economic" decisionmaking applied to the efficient exploitation of limiting resources.
Since the 1940s the dominant model of human economic decision-making has been the expected utility model first articulated by Bernoulli (12) AUGUST 1991 this particular example. For my purposes, it is sufficient to note that modern decision theories start with Bernoulli's suggestion that value is best represented by some form of nonlinear translation (U) of a concrete random variable (X) and that this nonlinear translation implies a sensitivity to risk and variability in choice situations.
Choices will also be influenced by the expected or arithmetic mean payofffrom a given distribution. If two distributions show the same risk, then the preference will be for whichever choice has the highest arithmetic mean payoff. Any theory of choice must contain both these aspects of preference; high expected gains will be preferred to low expected gains, low risks will be preferred to high risks. The expected utility model embraces these features of choice and explicit models attempt to partition the effects of central tendency and uncertainty as they contribute to decision-making. Formally (14, 15) , the expected utility generating from choice over some random variable X will be a function of both the mean and variance in X, that is,
Can we use this model to describe animal choice behavior? Are the animal's choices sensitive to the mean and variance in resources? What are the relative contributions of mean and variance in determining patterns of choice? And, what is the biological and evolutionary basis of "utility" and how can it be related to the information-processing and cognitive capabilities of the individual organism?
Risk-Aversion in Bumblebees
My first experiments ascertained the individual bee's response to variability in floral reward in different floral types (11) . Flowers, 100 blue and 100 yellow, were randomly spaced and interspersed throughout the artificial patch. Each blue flower contained 2 pA of nectar, whereas the yellow flowers contained 6 pA in one-third ofthe flowers and no nectar in the remaining two-thirds. Thus, blue and yellow flowers contained the same average (2 pA), but only yellow was risky. Single bees were introduced into the enclosure and allowed to visit approximately 40 flowers (a "foraging bout"). In these experiments I worked with five marked individual bees (Bombus pennsylvanicus). The proportion of flowers of each color visited by the individual bee and the sequence of visits by each bee were monitored for each trial, where a trial consisted of a known distribution of rewards inserted into the enclosure followed by a single bee's sequence ofvisits. After each trial, the artificial patch was cleaned, and a new or replicate distribution was established. A new bee was then allowed to forage from the patch.
Individual bees favored the constant blue over the variable yellow floral type and visited an average of 84 + 1% blue (Fig. 1 , solid line, trials 1 to 16). When the constant flower color is switched to yellow and blue is made variable (Fig. 1, trial 17) , the bees switch their preferences to the now constant yellow floral type and visited an average of 23 + 2% blue ( Fig. 1 , solid line, trials 17 to 29). There appears to be little, if any, historical influence on the bumblebees' choices evidenced by the rapid switch from blue to yellow preference at trial 17 and rendering irrelevant the order of color presentation. A comparison of the sequence of first ten visits at the beginning of a foraging bout and the last ten visits shows that the bees are random foragers at the onset of each trip and decide on which flower type to visit within each foraging sequence (11 contained some nectar. Preference for constant over variable floral type was preserved when the color for constant was switched to yellow and visited an average of 37 + 1% blue ( Fig. 1 , dashed line trials 17 to 31). Risk-aversion was substantially lower in the second set of experiments (dashed line). This reduction was expected because the variance in reward was smaller for the second set of experiments.
In general, in models of risk-taking, such as Eq. 1, it is assumed that increasing uncertainty can be compensated for by increasing expectation. In (Fig. 2, triangles) . Consequently, increasing variability and uncertainty in floral reward can be compensated for by increasing the expected reward in a simple linear fashion. This experiment effectively partitions the differential contributions of mean and variance in shaping floral choice for this particular environment by measuring the trade-offbetween these two variables along the indifference curve. Such a trade-off between mean and variance follows from several well-known economic models of choice-for example, the Markowitz-Tobin portfolio selection model where Eq. 1 follows:
where a is the coefficient of risk-aversion and corresponds to the slope of the indifference curve (15) .
Risk-sensitive foraging responses have now been suggested for a large number of animal species, including juncos (17), sparrows (18) , bananaquits (19) , shrews (20) , wasps (11), warblers (21), rats (22) , pigeons (23) , as well as other species of bumblebees (24) . In some cases, the trade-off between mean and variance in reward has also been established (25) . Experiments on risk-sensitive responses in animals, however, have often been confounded by uncontrolled variables making critical demonstrations difficult. For example, in the frequently cited study by Caraco et al. (17) , variance in reward is confounded with time and rate of delivery. Recent reviews examine much of the evidence for risk-sensitive responses in animals (26) . Detailed studies on the biological basis of utility and the biomechanics of foraging may help resolve some of the difficulties in assessing the mechanisms that generate observed responses to resource variability.
Biomechanics of Utility in Bumblebees
The behaviors described so far were clearly consistent with the expected utility hypothesis. But unlike economics, where utility is constructed or revealed on the basis of observed behavior (27) , in this biological system we can generate a functional account ofutility based on biomechanical principles and derived independently from observed choice behavior.
The observed risk-aversion in bumblebees implies that the utility of reward size to a forager is a positive decelerating function of the volume of nectar obtained per flower (11, 14, 16, 26) . If individual bees maximize their expected rate of net energy gain, then a nonlinear relation between nectar volume and rate of net energy uptake would account for risk-averse responses to variability in reward size. The maximization of the expected rate of net energy gain at the individual level is related to evolutionary fitness because the reproductive success of colonies is determined by the rate of Fig. 2 (i) energy entering the colony.
On the basis of biomechanical principles, Harder and Real (28) showed that the rate of net energy uptake (E) per flower for an individual foraging bee is represented by For the specific physiological parameters of an average B. pennsylvanicus and for the nectar and flower characteristics used in the artificial patch experiments, this rate of net energy gain is a positive decelerating function of nectar volume (Fig. 3) . Harder and Real (28) further showed that this physiologically based model was a fairly accurate predictor of the bumblebees' choice behavior over the different nectar distributions used in the earlier experiments. Consequently, we have a first principles account of risk-aversion in bumblebees that does not entail a constructed utility function revealed through choice behavior.
Computation, Perception, and the
Architecture of Choice
The biological account of risk-aversion that I have suggested assumes that information about floral rewards is processed in a particular fashion. Suppose a bee visits a sequence of n flowers during a foraging bout. where E1 represents the expected net energy gain from calculations based on attributes of single flowers. Such an averaging scheme amounts to calculating the expectation of the ratio of two random variables, E(R/T). In a simple stochastic rate process, or technically, a reward-renewal process, such as foraging from flowers, the maximization of E(R/T) leads to the maximization of short-term energy gain (29).
AUGUST 1991
Several authors have argued, however, that organisms should maximize long-term gain rather than short-term gain (30) . Maximizing long-term gain amounts to calculating the ratio of expectations of the random variables, that is E(R)/E(T). Actually there is a range of possible computational rules that lie between completely short-term and completely long-term gain corresponding to different ways of processing information from a string of flower visits. For example, rewards and times could be pooled across successive pairs of flowers in the string, that is, r R1 + R2 R3+ R4 Rn l1 + Rn ) gT1 + T2 T3 +T4
Tn+ + Tn or across triplets of flowers (E3), quadruplets (E4) of flowers, and so on. In the theoretical limit n -x m for which E. = E(R)/E(T) which corresponds to the long-term average rate of energetic gain (31) . Using the physiologically based expressions for R and T from the Harder-Real model (Eq. 3), for each distribution of floral rewards used in our trade-off experiments (Fig. 2) , the average rate of net energy gain Ek was calculated as a function of the frame size k over which samples are pooled. The frame size determines the fine structure required to process a particular string of information.
In the experiments, a foraging bumblebee visited approximately 35 to 40 flowers on average. Consequently, strings of 36 visits that could be partitioned according to at least nine different framing rules were modeled: single flowers, doubles, triples, quadruples, sets of 6, 9, 12, 18, and 36 flowers, respectively. Thus there are nine different ways of processing a string of 36 visits from these nine different frame sizes. For each reward distribution used in the trade-off experiments (Fig. 2) , preference rank was determined. The observed floral preferences were converted to scores of 1, 0, or -1 for yellow, indifferent, or blue preferences, respectively. Then 100 simulations were run of individual foragers each sampling 36 flowers from each of the distributions for which there were preference rankings. From each set of simulations and for each of the reward distributions the nine different Ek's corresponding to each of the nine different computational algorithms were calculated. Then the rank correlation (Kendall's r) between the observed preference score (1, 0, or -1) for a given distribution of rewards and the corresponding average was calculated. The correlations were determined over all nine frame lengths. In all the experiments, the correlation between expected rate of net energetic gain and observed preference was highest for short-term optimization (that is, frame length k = 1 or 2) and lowest for long-term optimization (frame length k = 36) (31).
These results suggest that bumblebees frame their decisions on the basis of individual flowers or on pairs of flowers, which results in short-term energy maximization. This analysis does not suggest that bees remember only their last few flower visits, but that they assemble information and track floral quality on the basis of individual flowers rather than pooling information across flowers. Several investigators, however, have argued that bumblebees have only short-term memory, and recent experiments suggest that foraging decisions in bumblebees are influenced by at least the last three flower visits, but perhaps no more than that (32, 33) . Are there scenarios under which calculations based on small frame lengths and short-term memory windows will prove evolutionarily advantageous?
Optimal Computational Rules
There are at least three scenarios under which calculations based on small frame lengths will prove advantageous. First 
E(R)/E(T)
. Short-term calculations are a more robust estimator of performance when sampling is truncated. More accurate estimation will especially occur when the reward (R) and the time to acquire the reward (I) are correlated. A positive correlation between R and T is guaranteed in floral systems simply because it takes more time to ingest greater quantities of nectar. There is considerable experimental and theoretical evidence suggesting that bees are constrained to only short-term memory windows (32, 33) and severe memory constraints have been invoked to account for the evolution of floral constancy in bumblebees (34) . Memory constraints may simply reflect lower neural complexity, and increased memory capacity may be correlated with the development ofmore complex neural systems (35) .
A second scenario suggests that short-term optimization is adaptive given the particular spatial structure of floral rewards in natural systems. In most field situations there is intense local competition among pollinators for floral resources. When a pollinator finds a local patch of flowers with abundant nectar, it generally restricts its foraging to neighboring plants, ultimately exhausting the resources in that local patch (36) . Such a foraging pattern will generate a high degree of spatial autocorrelation in nectar rewards, and fields are often characterized by "hot" and "cold" spots (37) . If information about individual flowers is pooled, then the spatial structure of reward distributions will be lost and foraging over the entire field will be less efficient. In spatially autocorrelated environments it pays not to pool information.
The implications of correlations in habitat structure on the framing of decisions has been explored by Cuthill et al. (38) The short-term memory (either as constraint or adaptation) and hierarchical processing schemes depend on some truncation of sampling or limits to recall in the nervous system. Ancillary evidence on how bumblebees form subjective estimates of probabilities support the view that bees engage in truncated sampling leading to bias in subjective probability formation.
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Computation and Subjective Probability Bias All decisions made under uncertainty demand that decisionmakers estimate the probability of particular outcomes. Perhaps the most exciting and challenging ideas in contemporary decision theory pertain to the misperception of objective probabilities. Many psychologists have argued (with some experimental evidence) that human beings (and some laboratory rats) consistently and systematically misperceive probabilities (40) . Low probability events seem to be overrepresented; high probability events are underrepresented. Humans tend to homogenize probabilities and weight events toward equal likelihood of occurrence. Do other animals show similar subjective probability biases, and how are biases related to information processing schema?
Eliciting probabilities from animals is difficult. Subjective probabilities must be constructed from patterns of choice over different reward options. The economic theories of "acceptance sets" and "state-preference" (41) provide a framework for this kind ofanalysis.
Imagine that the organism is faced with a choice in which it receives a reward X, if state S, occurs and X2 if state S2 occurs. We wish to determine the subjective probabilities the organism attaches to the occurrence of S, and S2. For example, nectar rewards within the class of yellow flowers might occur in two states corresponding to two reward levels with fixed probabilities p and 1 -p. The expected utility from such a set of alternatives is simply EU(X1, X2) = p U(X1) + (1 -p)U(X2) (6) For a fixed probability pair, we can determine the indifference set of reward states X1 and X2 that generate the same expected utility, that is, those values of X, and X2 for which EU(Xl, X2) = c, a constant.
We can construct a graph whose axes are the reward levels or states X1 and X2. The 450 line on this graph represents all alternatives for which X1 = X2; that is, alternative states for which the outcome of choice is certain. (Fig. 4, triangles) . Each with a solid triangle generated indifferent foraging between yellow and white flowers. The slope of the regression through the indifference points operationally measure the subjective probabilities.
If the bees' subjective probabilities corresponded to the objective probabilities, then the slope ofthe regression should equal -0.8/0.2 = -4. In actuality, the slope of the regression is equal to -8.5 (standard error of slope 2.30, P < 0.01), indicating that the bees treated a probability of 0.8 more like a probability of 0.9. Similarly, a probability of 0.2 was treated more like 0.1. When an event is common they overrepresent it; when rare, it is underrepresented. This makes some intuitive sense and may simply reflect that the bees pay attention to common phenomena and ignore rare events.
The bees' probability bias indicated in our experiments tends in the opposite direction from the bias proposed for human subjects. In part, this difference may be due to differences in informationprocessing schemes and memory constraints. We would expect overrepresentation of common events if bees form probabilities after only a few samples from the reward distribution. In the experiments, the rewards in the yellow flowers were highly skewed-events with probabilities 0.8 and 0.2. A truncated sample from such a distribution is most likely to generate overestimation of probabilities if bees form estimates on the bases of encounter frequency. For example, if bees truncate sampling after a single flower, then there is an 80% chance that the 0.8 probability event is actually perceived as equal to 1.0. As the sampling progresses, the subjective probability will converge to the objective probability, but short-term calculations and extremely truncated sampling will lead to high bias in probability estimates.
Additional experiments on bumblebee "switching" behavior also suggest that bumblebees underperceive rare events and overperceive common events (43 explained by simple nonlinearities in the perceptual field. The total weight of sensory input from blue flowers may be disproportionately great when blue is relatively more abundant. Excitation from yellow in the perceptual field may be reduced when input from blue is relatively higher. Predatory switching as a function of relative abundance has been observed often, and similar arguments for the role of information processing and signal detection have been articulated (44) . The perception of frequency and probability may then be recognized as a special problem in pattern recognition.
Conclusion
Bees may be viewed as short-term energy maximizers that employ computational rules that efficiently exploit the resources of their environments subject to possible neural or memory constraints, or both. Bees appear to form probabilities on the bases of frequency of encounter ofdifferent types of reward states and begin with no prior estimation oflikelihoods. The observed probability bias results from short-term calculations, truncated sampling, or both. Short-term computational rules will prove adaptive when animals are subject to (i) memory or perceptual constraints, (ii) attempting to efficiently exploit resources in a spatially autocorrelated environment, or (iii) the hierarchical classification or nesting of information.
Within the bumblebees environment, misperception may actually be adaptive. The computational algorithm that seems to lead to the most efficient exploitation of resources generates, as a by-product, a bias in probability estimation. Tversky and Kahneman (45) argue that perceptual biases may result from organisms generally adopting "heuristic" rules for decision-making. However, we must recognize that what constitutes an adaptive heuristic device in one species or in one environment may be mal-adaptive for other species in other environments.
Throughout this article, I have been using economic models of decision-making developed to account for patterns of choice in humans, and it seems natural to compare the performance of bees with the performance of humans when subjected to the same kinds of tasks that employ the same kinds of methods. However, evolutionary comparisons between bees and humans is exceedingly simplistic. Humans and bees do not share a recent evolutionary history or similar ecological requirements. What I have demonstrated here is how the computational rules employed by bees adapt them for efficient exploitation of the resources in their environments. Single species arguments for adaptive specialization in mental processes must be augmented by comparisons among closely related species and species performing similar ecological tasks. Comparative studies on the adaptive nature of cognitive function in vertebrates are under way (3, 5, 10) and invertebrate models, including bees, are starting to be explored (46 (Fig. 1) . 
